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NO. 14 FEBRUARY 2021 Introduction 
Back to the Future? 
International Climate Policy in 2021 
New Constellations for the EU’s Climate Diplomacy 
Susanne Dröge and Tessa-Sophie Schrader 
In 2021 the international climate policy agenda will need to catch up on much that 
was not accomplished in 2020. Because of the pandemic, deadlines were postponed 
and processes slowed down. What is the position of major climate policy powers in 
early 2021, and what momentum can we expect for international negotiations? The 
most important impetus this year will come from the EU, the US and China. However, 
since these three powers are also competitors, the EU and its member states will have 
to strengthen multilateral cooperation overall so as to push for reaching the Paris 
Agreement targets, formulate clear expectations, and ensure that all actors remain on 
equal terms. For Germany and the EU it will therefore be crucial to continue to focus 
decisively on joint action with partner countries within networks, and to concentrate 
on core issues with the US. Obvious areas for cooperation with Washington are a joint 
diplomatic approach for the next international climate conference (COP26), and rec-
onciling climate and trade policy. 
 
The COP26 in Glasgow will be the climate 
policy focus in 2021. The postponement 
by one year has given its co-organisers, the 
United Kingdom and Italy, more time to 
prepare. Both also hold additional impor-
tant positions in 2021: Italy chairs the G20, 
the UK the G7. These and other formats 
could be used to prepare the COP26. Con-
structive momentum for the conference 
also comes from climate-policy announce-
ments being made much more concrete in 
the EU (Green Deal), the US (regulations) 
and China (five-year plan). Moreover, sus-
tainable, “green” earmarking of stimulus 
packages became popular that most coun-
tries have had to pass because of the pan-
demic, as well as “greening” of the means 
made available by international financial 
institutions for overcoming the crisis. The 
related financial flows will continually have 
to be monitored for their de facto climate 
impacts. 
2021: A Full Agenda 
The Paris Agreement stipulates that its par-
ties have to submit new and more ambi-
tious Nationally Determined Contributions 
(NDCs) on climate mitigation, adaptation 
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and finance. By the end of January, 71 
countries had provided new NDCs. Long-
term climate plans are also due. 36 coun-
tries plus the EU have committed to so-
called neutrality targets. They determine 
long-term goals based on Article 4 of the 
Paris Agrement in which parties commit 
to “achiev[ing] a balance between anthro-
pogenic emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks of greenhouse gases [soils, forests, 
reservoirs – authors’ note] in the second 
half of this century”. 
Some parts of the Paris Rulebook still 
require a compromise, namely so-called 
Cooperative Approaches (Article 6 PA) like 
international emissions trading, and rules 
on reporting obligations. 
This year’s series of meetings in various 
formats and actor constellations started 
with the World Economic Forum in Davos 
and the Climate Adaptation Summit in the 
Netherlands, both in January. On 22 April 
US President Joseph Biden plans to hold a 
World Leaders Summit of the largest indus-
trialised nations. The G7 Summit in the UK 
is scheduled for June, the United Nations 
(UN) High-level Political Forum for sustainable 
development in New York for July. The 
UN General Assembly (UNGA) will meet in 
September, and the G20 Summit in Italy is 
planned for October. Climate policy will be 
at the top of the agenda of these meetings. 
Simultaneously, negotiations will continue 
under the UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC, intersessionals 
from 31 May to 10 June), to prepare deci-
sions for the COP26. 
The series of summits will ensure that 
the attention of heads of state and govern-
ment will remain high on climate policy 
despite the pandemic. But civil society will 
also return to exerting pressure – inter 
alia, because protests can once again be 
held in the streets. The publication of the 
first part of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) sixth assessment 
report, announced for April, will be an 
occasion for renewed pressure, as will the 
publication of further parts that are due 
before the COP26 in November. 
Key Players in 2021 
Climate Diplomacy 
On inauguration day the new US govern-
ment arranged to rejoin the Paris Agree-
ment. This will bring back momentum to 
2021 negotiations and the US will deter-
mine the international climate agenda 
alongside the EU and China. China an-
nounced new national climate targets 
already in September; the US government 
intends to follow by April. Moreover, indus-
trialised nations face a strong demand by 
many developing countries for more cli-
mate finance, which should also take into 
account the consequences of the pandemic. 
Notwithstanding this dynamic, individual 
G20 countries will oppose the Paris climate 
agenda, above all Saudi Arabia, Russia and 
Brazil. 
Europe: Master Clock for 
Climate Goals 
Shortly before the German presidency of 
the Council of the European Union ended 
in December 2020, EU heads of state and 
government agreed to increase the 2030 
climate target to at least 55 percent emis-
sions reductions compared to 1990. This 
target is part of the Green Deal, which con-
sists of over 50 political projects (incl. pro-
tecting biodiversity, climate-friendly mobil-
ity, increasing the energy efficiency of build-
ings, and reforming EU agriculture). The 
Commission will make legislative proposals 
to ensure that member states swiftly im-
plement these EU climate projects. The 
European Climate Law, which Commission 
President Ursula von der Leyen presented 
in March 2020, is at the core of climate legis-
lation. It stipulates that the EU will become 
climate neutral by 2050. Both the European 
Parliament (EP) and the Environment Coun-
cil agreed to the proposal with few amend-
ments in October 2020. Negotiations be-
tween the EP and member states on final 
details are to be concluded in March. By 
June the Commission plans to bring for-
ward 12 legal propositions to make the EU 
“Fit for 55”. 
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With a view to its presidency of the up-
coming COP26, in June 2019 the UK was the 
first major industrialised nation to pass a 
law intended to pave the way for green-
house gas neutrality in 2050. Brexit means 
that the UK’s NDC, previously negotiated 
at the EU level, is no longer valid. The UK 
government announced a new NDC in 
December, shortly before the Climate Am-
bition Summit held in Paris: reducing 
emissions by at least 68 percent by 2030. 
The target is embedded in the government’s 
ten-point plan for a green reconstruction of 
the British economy post-Covid. This pro-
gramme stipulates public investment of 12 
billion pounds Sterling (€13.4 bn), and aims 
to create up to 250,000 “green” jobs. Inter 
alia, the intention is to develop London into 
a global centre for “green finance”. In 2021 
the British government will concentrate 
above all on hosting the COP and G7. Close 
cooperation with the EU and Germany will 
be indispensable to make the negotiations 
successful. 
USA: Another Return 
On his first day in office, President Joseph 
Biden ordered the US’s immediate reacces-
sion to the Paris Agreement. His staffing 
decisions also signal that the US once again 
wants to shape international climate poli-
tics. John Kerry, secretary of state during 
Barack Obama’s second mandate, is the 
Special Presidential Envoy for Climate and 
has a seat at the cabinet table. 
Biden has declared that climate policy 
will be one of the top four topics of his 
term in office and a part of his adminis-
tration’s pandemic recovery package. His 
executive order, Tackling the Climate Crisis at 
Home and Abroad, makes it a key concern 
of his foreign and security policy. To restore 
its international credibility, the US will 
above all have to formulate an ambitious 
NDC alongside its climate diplomacy, and 
implement it rapidly. Analysts from the 
Rhodium Group have calculated that the 
US will need to reach a 2030 climate target 
of minus 40 to 50 percent as compared to 
2005 in order for the US economy to attain 
net zero emissions by 2050. Biden‘s plan 
for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental 
Justice, which is supposed to drive the climate-
friendly transformation of the economy 
over the next ten years, is endowed with 
US$1.7 trillion. Among other things, it 
intends to achieve a “carbon pollution-free” 
energy sector by 2035 and to reach net zero 
across the US by 2050. The plan also pro-
motes electromobility and energy efficiency 
of buildings. Biden has further announced 
that fossil fuel subsidies will be eliminated, 
US financing of oil and gas projects abroad 
will be discontinued, and imports will be 
subject to a CO2 border adjustment. 
However, the national implementation 
of these measures is not guaranteed, even 
though the Democrats now have a slim 
majority of 51 votes in the Senate. To set 
a new NDC – the current NDC consists of 
reducing 2005 emission levels by 26 to 28 
percent by 2025 – Biden’s climate package 
must quickly gain momentum. In this 
context, proposing new laws, for example 
to introduce a carbon price, is politically 
risky since it would require at least 60 votes 
in the Senate. Regulations by the Environment 
Protection Agency (EPA) and executive orders 
by the president will therefore be a key 
instrument of the new US administration’s 
Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environ-
mental Justice. 
In order for the US to restore trust with a 
view to the COP26, it is important to submit 
an NDC that is seen to be ambitious, along-
side swift implementation. In other words, 
a new NDC has to go far beyond the pre-
vious one. Given the energy with which 
the new US government has gone to work, 
there is certainly no lack of political will. 
Climate finance, which is of particular 
interest to developing countries, was taken 
up by John Kerry in the Climate Adaptation 
Summit in January. He announced signifi-
cant financial support – without giving 
specifics – for climate adaptation. He also 
stated that international partners could rely 
on US help through innovation and with 
climate data. 
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China and India: 
The Highest Emissions but 
not the Greatest Ambitions? 
In 2020 the Chinese president Xi Jinping 
surprisingly announced that China in-
tended to reach peak emissions before 2030 
and be CO2 neutral before 2060. It remains 
unclear how these targets are to be reached. 
The 2030 target has so far not been sub-
mitted as an NDC. The new five-year plan 
2021–2025, announced for the spring, is 
expected to contain answers as to how the 
Chinese government intends to reconcile its 
growth targets with its climate goals. After 
all, China is the top global greenhouse gas 
emitter – even if, from a historical per-
spective, the US and Europe lead on accu-
mulated emissions. 
Beijing continues to rely heavily on coal 
for electricity generation. China consumes 
about half of the global coal supply for its 
coal-fired plants alone. Beijing also partici-
pates in investments in coal power plants 
abroad as part of its Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI). Its domestic consumption is the 
greatest obstacle to reaching ambitious cli-
mate targets. For instance, the energy out-
put from its wind and solar facilities would 
have to be doubled within the next five 
years to meet the 2060 target. 
However, the Chinese government sub-
ordinates climate policy to its geopolitical 
interests, and has thus far not positioned 
itself as a leader in UN negotiations. On the 
contrary, encouraged by US foreign policy 
of the past four years China has retracted 
promises that it had made as part of the 
Paris Agreement negotiations. Originally 
Chinese leader Xi along with the EU and 
other countries intended to fill the leader-
ship gap left by the US, but no actions fol-
lowed his speech at the 2017 World Eco-
nomic Forum. The climate goals announced 
last September at the UNGA were all the 
more surprising. This move indicates that 
Beijing considers climate policy a part of its 
systemic rivalry with the US and EU. After 
all, the move at the UNGA created the im-
pression that China was far ahead of the US 
on climate policy. The EU and US will have 
to renegotiate cooperation with China at 
the UN as well as bilateral and trilateral 
levels this year. 
In its current NDC, the Indian govern-
ment has not set any climate targets that 
define an emissions reduction in absolute 
terms, and, as with China, it is not expected 
to in the next NDC either. India has been 
hard hit by the pandemic and combating it 
has tied up political capacities. However, 
the Indian government has always been 
reserved on international environmental 
commitments, in particular because it sees 
industrialised nations as responsible for 
climate change. India’s share of global 
emissions puts it in fourth place. Thus far, 
the government has focused on the emis-
sions intensity of the economy rather than 
setting absolute targets. Per unit of gross 
domestic product, this intensity is meant to 
decrease by 33 to 35 percent as compared 
to 2005. By 2040 India’s electricity supply 
from non-fossil sources is to reach 40 per-
cent of the total. Due to the economic con-
sequences of the coronavirus pandemic, 
India’s emissions fell for the first time in 40 
years. If this trend (which is mainly based 
on less coal-based electricity generation) 
continues, the country is heading towards 
a share of 60 to 65 percent non-fossil ener-
gies. Many G77 countries see India as a role 
model, and New Delhi is increasingly ring-
fencing itself from China’s economic influ-
ence. It will be important for Europe and 
the US to exchange with India in the run-
up to the COP26 with a view to the G77. 
Boris Johnson’s invitation to India for the 
G7 summit takes this into account. An EU-
India summit is scheduled for 8 May. 
Japan and South Korea are 
joining in; Australia is not 
After Beijing published its climate targets, 
the Japanese government followed suit in 
October 2020 and declared its intention of 
making the country climate-neutral by 
2050 (according to Climate Action Tracker). 
Japan’s current NDC for 2030 is seen as 
lacking ambition. However, President Suga 
has announced that a higher target will be 
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submitted before the COP26. To reach its 
2050 target, Tokyo intends to exploit the 
US$708 bn stimulus package. This package 
includes US$19.2 bn earmarked for climate 
measures. The Japanese industry does not 
want to miss out on the race for environ-
mental technologies. The government is 
therefore attempting to start long-delayed 
restructuring towards renewable energy 
sources, and is investing in infrastructure 
and innovation. 
South Korea also followed suit and in 
late 2020 announced an NDC with emis-
sions reductions of 24.4 percent as com-
pared to 2017. By 2025 at the latest the 
government plans to declare a more ambi-
tious goal for 2030, enabling CO2 neutrality 
by 2050. After the 2009 financial and eco-
nomic crisis, South Korea had stated that it 
was committed to establishing a Green 
Economy. The South Korean Covid stimulus 
package also has a green focus: the so-called 
Korean New Deal (K-New Deal) is worth 
US$135 bn, almost half of which is intended 
for creating green jobs. Along with invest-
ments in future technologies and infra-
structure, the K-New Deal includes a target 
of CO2 neutrality by 2050. Critics point out 
that the K-New Deal is grey rather than 
green, inter alia because it also promotes 
fossil fuels such as LNG along with renew-
able energies. A significant part of the plan, 
they claim, is based on the as yet unproven 
competitiveness of hydrogen in the trans-
port sector. 
Australia, on the contrary, has a govern-
ment that is critical of more ambitious 
climate targets. It has not raised its NDC. 
Australia is the world’s largest exporter of 
LNG and its second-largest exporter of coal. 
The Australian government under Prime 
Minister Scott Morrison openly represents 
coal industry interests and objects to strict 
international climate rules. Even the devas-
tating heat wave and fires of 2020 have not 
made the Australian government more 
cooperative on international climate policy, 
despite public protests for more climate 
protection. Canberra’s climate policy seems 
particularly contradictory given its plan to 
establish itself as one of the world’s largest 
hydrogen exporters. Along with Germany, 
Australia is currently examining supply 
chains for green hydrogen. 
EU Starting Points for the 
International Climate Process 
Commission President von der Leyen wants 
to position the EU as a geopolitical actor. 
Climate policy is an integral part of this 
effort. However, the EU’s objective of assert-
ing itself amidst the US-China power rivalry, 
as well as multipolar developments, partly 
conflicts with well-worn climate diplomacy. 
The EU cannot push for a swift implemen-
tation of the Paris Agreement without the 
two largest economies, the US and China. 
Just as important is the integration of other 
G20 countries, especially Brazil, Australia, 
Saudi Arabia and Russia, and the many G77 
countries. Otherwise the climate projects of 
the Green Deal cannot succeed by 2030. The 
US announcement of fully rejoining multi-
lateral climate policy is therefore auspicious. 
However, given the Green Deal and the lead-
ing role that the EU has shouldered in the 
past few years, it is imperative that the EU 
positions itself clearly vis-à-vis all partners. 
After all the Biden administration also lays 
claim to being a climate-policy superpower. 
Positioning vis-à-vis China 
and the US 
In the past, the EU has successfully cooper-
ated on climate policy with China, for 
instance when the People’s Republic devel-
oped emissions trading along the European 
model. However, overall relations between 
the EU and China have deteriorated during 
the past two years. Furthermore in the UN 
climate negotiations, Beijing has reverted to 
claiming the status of a developing country, 
so as to avoid having to apply, for example, 
international standards for measuring 
greenhouse gases. 
For the EU and US the issue of transpar-
ency is non-negotiable; it will once again 
be one of the crucial themes in the COP26 
talks. However, with its Green Deal the EU 
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can now set new priorities in its climate 
diplomacy – not just at the UN level, but 
also in direct exchanges with Beijing. These 
include making progress in climate protec-
tion also through trade initiatives and the 
development of new technologies. The 
Commission has suggested it will relieve 
European companies, which face rising 
costs because of the new 2030 climate tar-
get, from competitive pressure caused by 
imports. A so-called Carbon Border Adjust-
ment Mechanism (CBAM) is part of the Fit-
for-55 package and is supposed to charge 
imports according to their carbon content. 
A considerable part of imports that would 
be covered by it, for instance cement or 
steel products, come from China. The CBAM 
plans could increase Beijing’s domestic 
efforts to broaden its emissions trading and 
even define an absolute emission cap, so as 
to reduce or even entirely avoid EU import 
charges. Again transparent data are an in-
dispensable tool in this respect. 
Vis-à-vis China, the EU and its member 
states have to find the right balance be-
tween cooperation and competition. With 
the US, they will have to rapidly explore the 
most productive options for cooperation 
with a view to the COP26. The new US gov-
ernment’s decisiveness in devoting itself 
to climate policy will fan the competition 
between the three big players over new 
ideas, technologies and international 
leadership beyond 2021. 
It will be difficult, however, to proceed 
jointly on the CBAM. The Commission and 
member states are demanding that WTO 
rules be met. Without carbon pricing in 
the US – which will not happen on the 
national level in the foreseeable future – 
the Biden administration will have to em-
ploy executive orders and trade rule exemp-
tions to bring a border adjustment in line 
with international trade law – unless it 
decides to ignore WTO rules entirely. It 
would therefore be preferable to link EU-US 
climate cooperation with new approaches 
to trade cooperation, and leave enough 
time for thorough investigations into a 
border adjustment. 
Fossil Fuels and Carbon Markets 
Remain Sticking Points 
Any progress in international climate pro-
tection will depend on whether hesitant 
countries can be pulled along. The most 
important projects of the EU, the US and 
documented in many NDCs, focus on the 
reduction of fossil fuel consumption. While 
for emerging economies such as India this 
seems to be mainly a question of timing 
and costs, for fossil fuels exporters (incl. 
Iraq, Australia and Russia) a drop in de-
mand is not an appealing prospect. How-
ever, when the world’s leading oil exporter 
Saudi Arabia chaired the G20 in 2020, it 
emphasised the role that carbon capture 
and storage technologies play in climate 
mitigation, and the government wants to 
follow the German example in expanding 
renewable energies. In this respect, it is to 
be expected that at the COP26 parties will 
again address technological issues, the costs 
of climate policy for these producer coun-
tries, and the impact on investment. Ger-
many’s and the EU’s hydrogen strategy 
is one starting point for identifying new 
cooperative pathways. This will require, 
among other things, international stand-
ards to guarantee that “green” hydrogen 
really is produced in a carbon-free manner 
(see SWP Comment 2020/C 32). 
Investment in climate-friendly energies 
and carbon sinks will depend to a large 
degree on a breakthrough at COP26 about 
the governance for international trade in 
emissions certificates. High standards will 
have to be agreed upon for such trading 
systems in order to avoid double accounting 
and defraud on the substance of verified 
emission reductions. For this, the EU will 
need US support. Strict quality require-
ments are resisted by those countries hop-
ing for new revenues from certification and 
little control. Moreover, Brazil has success-
fully blocked any agreement so as to secure 
its substantial income from emissions cer-
tificates during transition from the old trad-
ing system set up by the Kyoto Protocol. 
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Last but Not Least: Building 
Confidence in the UN Process 
EU climate diplomacy will be called upon 
to convince developing countries that they 
can trust the UN process – and the US’s 
climate action – despite the consequences 
of the pandemic. Washington’s complete 
reversals in the past on both compliance 
with agreements and financing climate 
action have led to doubts as to whether the 
US is a reliable long-term partner at all. In 
2021 Europe’s negotiators will most likely 
find themselves in a situation where they 
need to ask poor countries to trust the new 
US climate policy. 
The most recent UNEP Adaptation Gap 
Report estimates that developing countries 
will need US$70 bn per year for adaptation 
to climate change. It considers a fourfold 
increase by 2030 to be possible. The pan-
demic has emptied public coffers. In his 
first international appearance at the Cli-
mate Adaptation Summit, John Kerry was 
not yet able to commit the US to any spe-
cific financial support for poor countries. 
Neither was China. Germany pledged €220 
million in additional support. Yet the issue 
of financing will once again determine 
whether real progress is made at COP26; 
due to the pandemic, demands will be more 
vocal this year. Talks at the G-formats could 
also be used to improve financial room for 
manoeuvre for developing countries’ assis-
tance. For example, aid could be freed up by 
reducing subsidies for fossil fuels. Beyond 
that, collective debt relief linked to climate 
policy objectives could be envisaged. 
Conclusion 
With the US rejoining international climate 
policy, progress in implementing the Paris 
Agreement seems once again possible. New 
dynamics between the US and China, in-
cluding in trade policy, will have an impact 
on the summits that are planned for 2021. 
After the first phase of the US climate 
policy offensive, the EU and its member 
states will need to define their position and 
pursue their own priorities. Closer coopera-
tion on new technologies and the introduc-
tion of the EU’s CBAM are under discussion. 
The EU should also press ahead with long-
term climate and energy initiatives with 
other partners. 
For four years Europe, almost on its own, 
managed to drive forward international cli-
mate policy as one of the most important 
multilateral issues – albeit with only slug-
gish progress. Some of the Green Deal 
projects will have to be reevaluated as part 
of the new positive dynamic. However, if 
the EU wants to safeguard its strategic posi-
tion in the long term it will undoubtedly 
have to assert itself as an actor with its own 
claims, positioned between the US and 
China, and as a partner for the many devel-
oping countries. In climate policy, the EU 
should therefore focus not only on more 
intensive cooperation with the US and, 
where possible, with China. It should also 
ensure that the playing field stays level and 
that it clearly sets out its own interests 
within the negotiations. 
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